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Abstract
We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal
protection of outside investors. We offer a new illustration that law matters by demonstrating that for
large investment projects, Project Finance provides a contractual and organizational substitute for investor
protection laws. Project Finance accomplishes this by making cash flows verifiable through two
mechanisms: (i) contractual arrangements made possible by structuring the project within a single,
discrete entity legally separate from the sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a
network of project accounts that ensures lender control of project cash flows. Comparing bank loans for
Project Finance with regular corporate loans for large investments, we show that Project Finance is more
likely in countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights in bankruptcy. We
identify the predicted effects using difference-in-difference and triple-difference tests that exploit
exogenous country-level legal changes and inter-industry differences in free cash flow and tangibility of
assets.
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I.

Introduction
The law and finance literature (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) highlights that legal rules protecting

outside investors vary systematically across countries. As the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) predicts,
market participants often respond to the inefficiencies from weak investor protection laws by resorting to
contractual and private enforcement mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate one instance of this
broader phenomenon. We examine Project Finance as a private response to the risks posed by the
financing of large investment projects in countries with weak investor protection.
Project Finance (hereafter PF) represents an important financing mechanism for large investment
projects. Worldwide, the use of PF has grown dramatically, from a then-record of $217 billion in 2001 to
a record $328 billion in 2006 (Esty and Sesia, 2007), though current numbers are lower at $195 billion in
2012. Between 1991 and 2012, PF raised over $2.5 trillion to fund almost 6000 projects.1 Moreover, the
incidence of PF in a country correlates with its economic growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010). Yet, the
choice between financing large projects through in-house Corporate Debt Finance (hereafter CDF) versus
through PF has yet to be studied empirically. Our investigation intends to fill this gap.
We observe that PF is considerably more prevalent, relative to CDF, in French than in English
legal origin countries: 55% versus 36%. Even when we exclude observations for the U.S., we find this
difference to be quite significant: 55% versus 37%. Investor protection laws are also weaker in French
legal origin countries than in the English legal origin countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), suggesting
that investor protection laws may be important in determining the choice of PF versus CDF.
In PF, a legally independent project company is created to own and invest in the project, and the
project debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi 2000; Esty 2003). With
this structure, project cash flows become the essential means for repaying the lender. Verifiability of cash
flows, therefore, becomes crucial. PF enhances verifiability by the lender through (i) contractual
constraints on cash flows that are made possible by the special structuring of the PF company; and
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(ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that are under the
lender's control and into which project cash flows are required to be deposited. Contractual constraints on
cash flows are possible because the Project Company (i) owns only the single, discrete project for which
it is created; and (ii) is legally separate from the sponsor. Therefore, project cash flows can be
meaningfully separated from the sponsor's other cash flows.
With CDF, by contrast, the commingling of cash flows from multiple projects makes it difficult
to segregate project cash flows. Lender monitoring of project cash flows is therefore difficult. Moreover,
tightly enforced cash flow constraints similar to those in PF would impede managerial discretion in CDF,
which involves not only multiple projects but also internal capital markets within the corporate entity.
Therefore, contractual arrangements that are possible in PF cannot be effected in CDF. The choice of PF
versus CDF thus presents a trade-off. CDF offers managerial flexibility with respect to allocation of cash
flows, but these cash flows are less verifiable. Conversely, PF offers cash flow verifiability, but the
attendant cash flow controls preclude managers from funding project-related growth opportunities from
internal cash flows or reallocating cash flows across multiple projects, as is possible with CDF.2
In countries with weak investor protection, it is a priori unclear whether firms and their lenders
will prefer the cash flow verifiability that PF offers or the financing flexibility of CDF. PF might be
attractive in a country whose corporate and bankruptcy laws provide weak investor protection, since CDF
can lead to expropriation of outside investors by corporate insiders. As in Diamond (2004), stronger laws
against insider stealing limit diversion of cash flows ex post. Ex ante, this causes a rightward shift in the
entire distribution of cash flows available to all claimants — creditors as well as equityholders. Given
their concave payoffs, creditors care about the left tail of the cash flow distribution. Therefore, stronger
laws against insider stealing increase the prospects for repayment and decrease the probability of default
in CDF. At the same time, stronger creditor rights enhance the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets.
2

Project Finance also involves significant transaction costs. For example, creating a stand-alone project company
may take from six months to more than a year, and the contracting and other transaction costs may consume from
5% to 10% of the project's total cost (Esty, 2003). Second, the up-front fees are considerably higher for project debt
than for corporate debt. Finally, lenders to project companies charge advisory fees of up to 50 to 100 basis points for
advice on the financial structure of the transaction (Esty, 2003b).
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When cash flows are not verifiable, as with CDF, the lender's threat to liquidate collateral assets is central
to forcing the borrower to repay (Hart 1995). However, the lender can liquidate collateral assets only if
the legal system provides strong creditor rights. Firms and their lenders may respond to weak investor
protection by employing PF, where cash flow verifiability reduces agency costs and enhances the project's
debt capacity. With respect to financing of large investment projects, then, PF offers a private contractual
and organizational substitute for investor protection laws. This analysis suggests that PF should be more
prevalent than CDF in countries with weak investor protection.
However, weak investor protection laws may have the exact opposite effect. Because external
financing is more expensive in countries offering weak investor protection, firms may value the flexibility
offered by CDF, which enables firms to preserve larger internal capital markets. This flexibility may be
more important to firms than the cash flow verifiability that PF offers. Ultimately, which of these two
effects manifests is an empirical question, which we attempt to answer in this paper.
Since Project Finance involves primarily bank debt for large investments (Esty 2003), we test our
hypotheses by comparing bank loans for PF with bank loans to conventional corporations for their large
investments, i.e. CDF. We carefully identify categories of CDF loans such that for each loan in our
sample, the counterfactual choice between PF and our sampled categories of CDF is plausible. The
sample of bank loans is drawn from Loan Pricing Corporation's Dealscan database, which offers the best
source for international bank loans (Qian and Strahan, 2007).
Given our cross-country setting, inferring a causal relationship between country-level investor
protection laws and the deal-level choice between PF and CDF presents several challenges. First, countrylevel laws governing insider stealing and creditor rights may be correlated with other country-level
unobserved factors. Second, agency cost considerations are not the sole motivation for PF. Proving our
agency cost story requires that we account for other possible motivations as well – most importantly,
those relating to asset choice, debt overhang, and risk management (Esty 2003). Third, potential sample
selection problems could bias our results. Fourth, differences in tax rates and tax treatment of debt across
different countries may affect the choice of PF versus CDF.
3

To address such econometric concerns, we undertake difference-in-difference and tripledifference tests that exploit exogenous country-level changes in (i) creditor rights; and (ii) laws relating to
shareholder derivative suits, which affect shareholders' legal protection. In particular, to highlight a causal
mechanism for our results and to rule out the effect of any country-level omitted variables, we investigate
inter-industry differences in the effect of investor protection laws on the choice of PF versus CDF. We
conduct triple-difference tests interacting measures of industry-level (a) free cash flow to assets and (b)
asset tangibility with the variables reflecting the exogenous legal changes. Since PF renders cash flows
verifiable, we predict that the effect of these legal changes would be disproportionately greater for
industries with higher free cash flows, and hence higher agency costs (Jensen 1986). Conversely, we
predict that the effect of our legal changes would be disproportionately weaker in tangible-asset-intensive
industries. Because tangible assets are easier to monitor and harder to steal, they provide more attractive
collateral than intangible assets. Since tangible-asset collateral provides better protection against default
than intangible assets, the increased likelihood of strategic default from weak investor protection is less a
constraint on firms’ ability to raise CDF in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-assetintensive industries. Therefore, investor protection should affect the choice of PF versus CDF
disproportionately less in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-asset-intensive industries.
We instrument for industry-level free cash flows and asset tangibility in a given country using
measures of U.S. industry free cash flow and asset tangibility (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Consistent with
our hypotheses, we find that changes in investor protection have disproportionately greater effects in
industries with higher agency costs of free cash flow and disproportionately weaker effects in tangibleasset-intensive industries. These triple-difference tests alleviate endogeneity and sample selection
concerns on many key dimensions and thereby offer strong evidence supporting our hypotheses. These
tests also enable us to highlight the agency cost channel through which investor protection laws affect the
choice of PF versus CDF.
The economic effects are significant. In our difference-in-difference tests, a decrease in creditor
rights increases the likelihood of PF at least by 3.4%. Also, an improvement in shareholders' right to
4

derivative suits decreases the likelihood of PF at least by 7.1%. Given the baseline PF percentage of 42%,
these differences are economically significant.
Our key contribution is to offer a new illustration that law matters, this time in the context of debt
financing of large investment projects. Stronger investor protection laws enhance debt capacity in CDF by
improving borrowers' ability to credibly commit ex-ante that they will not strategically default ex-post.
Like concentrated ownership for equity investors (La Porta et al. 1998), PF represents the private
response of firms and their investors – here, lenders – to weak investor protection. By employing PF as a
counter-factual to CDF, our results imply that stronger investor protection encourages CDF by obviating
the need for a costly and specialized form of financing that renders cash flows verifiable to the lender,
namely PF. To our knowledge, our study is the first to offer such large sample cross-country evidence.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III explains the key
institutional features of PF. Section IV describes our hypotheses. Section V describes our data while
Section VI presents the results. Section VII provides a discussion of our results. Section VIII concludes.

II.

Review of Literature
As a broad research inquiry, our paper is closely related to the law and finance literature (see La

Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Djankov et. al., 2006; Djankov et. al., 2007). As noted earlier, PF offers an
important financing vehicle for large investment projects and correlates with a country’s economic
growth. Our study complements the prior literature by examining the effect of investor protection laws on
this important financing choice. We also show that legal origin matters through the provision of investor
protection by reducing the effect of agency costs on financing choices. By identifying a micro channel for
the effect of legal origins on financing outcomes, this paper complements Qian and Strahan (2007), who
find evidence that country level legal and institutional variables affect various price and non-price
features of debt contracts.
This paper augments the literature examining PF as an optimal organizational and financing
choice. Like our study, Chemmanur and John (1996) focus on the cash flow aspect of PF, asserting that
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PF’s key feature is the segregation of project cash flows from those of the sponsor. Their formal analysis
shows that PF would dominate other alternatives when the structure of the sponsor's private control
benefits differs substantially across its projects. Related to this, Shah and Thakor (1987) show that in an
asymmetric information setting, PF is sometimes optimal because it lowers creditors’ screening costs in
evaluating the separately-incorporated project cash flows and mitigates the potential contagion effect of
high debt levels on sponsors’ solvency. In contrast to Chemmanur and John (1996), we argue informally
here that the (lack of) verifiability of cash flows in (CDF) PF, and therefore the (higher) lower private
benefits, arise endogenously because of the nature of the contracts that can (not) be written in (CDF) PF.
Hainz and Kleimeier (2011) offer a contemporaneous study closely related to ours. They investigate loan
contracting in environments with high political risk. Controlling for the legal and institutional
environment, they show that political risk correlates with both the use of PF and the participation of
development banks in loan syndicates, suggesting that PF and the presence of development banks help
mitigate political risk.3
Esty (2003) articulates the important institutional details of PF and argues that the governance
structure of project companies combines with high leverage to mitigate agency conflicts. He supports his
analysis with detailed case studies and field research. Corielli at al. (2010) study the effects on PF of
projects’ non-financial contracts. They show that use of non-financial contracts—contracts for
engineering and construction, agreements for inputs and outputs, and operation and maintenance
agreements—reduces loan spreads by reducing agency costs and volatility of project cash flow. Also
when sponsors are not key counterparties to those contracts, loan spreads and lenders’ demands for
sponsor equity contributions are lower. Gatti et al. (2013) demonstrate the crucial certification role that
lead arranging banks play in PF, finding that more prestigious lead arrangers reduce overall loan spreads.
3

Interestingly for our purposes, they find a positive correlation between creditor rights and the incidence of PF,
which is contrary to our results below. However, their sample differs from ours in a number of respects: Their
sample excludes U.S. borrowers. Also their comparator set of non-PF loans includes what they call “asset-based”
full recourse loans, based on a broader range of DealScan loan purpose categories than ours. As explained below in
Section V.A., we include only “Capital Expenditure” loans and large “Corporate Purpose” term loans as our CDF
comparators to PF. Hainz and Kleimeier’s sample, however, additionally includes loans for “telecom buildout,”
“aircraft and ship finance,” “leasing,” and “real estate.”
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Berkovitch and Kim (1990) formally show that if information between debtholders and equityholders is
symmetric, PF simultaneously alleviates the problems of under- and over-investment. We complement
these studies by employing a large sample of international loans to demonstrate empirically that PF offers
a private substitute for legal rules designed to reduce agency conflicts.
Other studies have examined the relationship between PF and legal environments. Kleimeier and
Megginson (2000) compare PF loans to non-PF loans, and find that PF loans are far more likely to be
extended to borrowers in riskier countries, particularly countries with higher political and economic risks.
Esty and Megginson (2003) analyze syndicated PF loans to examine the effect of creditor rights and
reliable legal enforcement on the pattern of debt ownership. We contribute to this literature by
documenting the effect of a specific country-level risk – the quality of legal protection of outside
investors – on the choice of PF versus CDF.

III.

Institutional Aspects of PF
PF has four essential features. First, it involves creation of a legally independent Project

Company to own and invest in the project. Second, the Project Company invests only in the particular
project for which it is created; it is typically dissolved once the project is completed. Third, the project
debt is structured without recourse to the sponsors (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000; Esty, 2003). These three
features together imply that cash flows from the project are the essential means to repay the lender. This
observation leads to the fourth essential aspect of PF, which has gone underemphasized in the literature
but is the focus of our analysis: PF includes severe constraints on the use and disposition of project cash
flows. Compared to CDF, the sponsoring firms have considerably reduced discretion over project cash
flows. PF also typically involves very high leverage, the bulk of which is in the form of bank debt.
In PF, project cash flows can be easily separated from those of the sponsor since the Project
Company is legally independent and consists of a single project. This enables the Project Company to
enter into detailed arrangements with its lenders concerning the use of cash, including private
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enforcement through lender-controlled project accounts. This extremely detailed control of cash flow is
unique to PF, which is sometimes referred to as "contractual finance." (Esty and Megginson, 2003).
Contractual arrangements dictate a cash flow waterfall, specifying the order in which project cash
flows must be distributed. Typically, the borrower is required to use project cash flows first in satisfaction
of operating expenses, and then to pay interest and loan principal. The contracts also structure how excess
cash flow – cash flow available in excess of what is required to satisfy project expenses and debt
repayment – is distributed. The contracts adjust the borrower's repayment schedule for a number of
contingencies based on pre-defined financial ratios. The contract commonly includes "cash sharing",
"lockup" and "mandatory cash sweep" provisions, which effectively amortize debt at a rate faster than
originally scheduled if the project performs appreciably better or appreciably worse than anticipated. We
refer the reader to Borgonovo and Gatti (2013) for a detailed description of the covenants used in PF.
The waterfall arrangement is enforced through a variety of project accounts that are typically
(a) under the lender's control, and (b) held offshore in order to mitigate currency and other political risks
(Buljevich and Park, 1999). These accounts include (i) a proceeds account, into which project revenues
are deposited; (ii) a disbursement account, into which all payments to the lender and any distributions to
equityholders are deposited; and (iii) a debt service reserve account, in which cash flows are set aside to
enable payment of principal and interest in case project revenues are not available. Since these accounts
are controlled by the lender, they provide the lender a framework to monitor the borrower's activities
without getting involved in the borrower's day-to-day affairs. These lender-controlled project accounts
lend teeth to the elaborate and finely-tuned contracting undertaken in the cash flow waterfall contract.
These teeth matter especially in countries with weak legal environments, where writing and enforcing
contracts may be especially costly.

IV.

Empirical Hypotheses
Our prior is that in countries with weak investor protection, firms and their lenders will generally

prefer the cash flow verifiability of PF to the financing flexibility of CDF, and we articulate our
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hypotheses accordingly. Since cash flows are verifiable with PF but more difficult to verify in CDF, we
predict that:
HYPOTHESIS 1: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where creditor rights in
bankruptcy are stronger.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Ceteris paribus, CDF is more likely than PF in countries where the protection against
insider stealing is stronger.
As well, because the entirety of project cash flows can be pledged in PF, but only a portion of
cash flows can be pledged in CDF, this difference in pledgeable cash flows increases with the level of
free cash flows in an industry. Since the pledgeability of cash flows in CDF increases with investor
protection, we also predict that:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Ceteris paribus, the marginal effects of laws against insider stealing and creditor rights
on the choice of PF versus CDF increase with the level of free cash flow in an industry.
PF is typically collateralized through project cash flows, while CDF is collateralized through
project/sponsor assets. Because tangible assets are easier to monitor and harder to steal, they provide
more attractive collateral than intangible assets. Since tangible-asset collateral provides better protection
against default than intangible assets, the increased likelihood of strategic default from weak investor
protection is less a constraint on firms’ ability to raise CDF in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in
intangible-asset-intensive industries. Therefore, the marginal effect of investor protection on the choice of
PF versus CDF is disproportionately lower in tangible-asset-intensive industries than in intangible-assetintensive industries. Thus:
HYPOTHESIS 4: Ceteris paribus, the marginal effects of laws against insider stealing and creditor rights
on the choice of PF versus CDF decrease with the level of tangible assets in an industry.

9

V.

Data, Sample and Proxies

A.

Sample
We test our predictions using bank loans for PF and CDF from LPC Dealscan; thus our sample

includes only firms with PF or CDF loans. Eighty percent of the debt in PF comprises bank debt (Esty,
2003), which is typically in the form of large internationally syndicated loans. We remove syndicated
loans with lenders from multiple countries. This enables us to focus on the effect of investor protection on
the choice of PF versus CDF within a given country.
We carefully identify categories of CDF loans such that for each loan in our sample, the
counterfactual choice between PF and our sampled categories of CDF is plausible. To determine which
CDF loans to include, we rely on Dealscan's attribution of the primary purpose for each loan, as well as
industry classification. Since PF involves the creation of "a single purpose capital asset" (Esty, 2003),
CDF loans with "Capital Expenditures" as their primary purpose offer a natural set of counterfactuals to
PF. Indeed, after winsorizing at the 99% level to exclude outliers, we find in Panel A of Table 1 that the
loan amounts for Capital Expenditure and PF loans are very similar. The distributions of Capital
Expenditure and PF loans are also similar with respect to loan maturity and the number of lenders.4
In addition to Capital Expenditure loans, we also include large term loans for "Corporate
Purposes" in our sampled CDF loans. Since PF involves large investments, large term loans for
"Corporate Purposes" comprise another category where the counterfactual choice of PF is plausible.
Consistent with the minimum loan amount for PF loans, which is $10.0 million after winsorizing at the
95% level, we exclude all Corporate Purpose Term Loans with loan amounts (converted in dollars) less
than $10.0 million. After this exclusion, we find in Panel A of Table 1 that the mean and median loan
amounts for Corporate Purpose term loans are slightly smaller than that for PF loans. Examining the
distributions for loan size, loan maturity and number of lenders across the three loan categories suggests
that the distribution of loans is very similar for both CDF and PF. Panel B of Table 1 shows the
4

At the median (mean), the amount of the capital expenditure loan equals 12% (18%) of the CDF borrower’s total
assets, confirming that the identified capital expenditure projects indeed represent large investments.
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distribution of PF and CDF bank loans by industry.5 Panel C displays the summary statistics for the key
explanatory variables.
Our sample includes loans originated from 1993 to 2007; we terminate our sample in 2007 to
avoid the effects of changes due to the financial crisis starting in 2008. We treat as outliers those countries
with less than five PF or CDF observations during our sample period, and we remove these countries
from our sample. Our final deal-level sample contains 18257 deals from 43 countries.6 In our industry
level tests, we have a balanced sample of 4515 observations (43 countries x 15 years (1993-2007) x 7
broad industries). Table 2 displays the number of observations by country, the number of PF and CDF
deals, and the percentage of PF deals.

B.

Key Explanatory Variables
Table 3 provides a summary of all the explanatory variables and their sources. In the spirit of

Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), where the ex-ante financing outcome is affected by the ex-post likelihood
of a sponsor/manager being caught stealing, our proxy for protection against insider stealing is the index
of ex-post private control of self-dealing constructed by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer
(2006) (DLLS). This measure captures the extent of ex-post disclosure that the controlling shareholder
must provide in order to engage in a self-dealing transaction and the ease of proving wrongdoing once
such a transaction is detected.7 We also rely on one component of the DLLS index—shareholders’ right to
bring a derivative suit—in our differencing regressions. We use the creditor rights index constructed in

5

In examining our data, we found that a few industries were outliers in terms of the dominance of PF over CDF
deals or vice versa. Therefore, to ensure the integrity of our comparisons, we exclude all loans for Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing (SIC codes 1-8) and Public Administration (SIC codes 91-97). The former shows only seven
PF deals during our sample period while the latter shows only four CDF deals.
6
A loan deal in Dealscan may contain multiple facilities such as a term loan, a line of credit, etc. We carefully
eyeballed the data and found that multiple facilities in a deal can be identified when (a) the borrower name and the
deal active date are identical; (b) the primary purpose is the same across the facilities, and (c) aggregating the
tranche amounts on each of the facilities yields a sum equal to the loan amount. Hence, we used these three criteria
to aggregate the data from the facility to the deal level. For our Corporate Purpose Term Loans, we include only
those deals that contain a facility designated as a Term Loan.
7
This survey measure is not subject to inconsistent coding/ definition (Spamann 2010).
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Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007) (DMS) to proxy for creditor rights. A higher value for the DMS
index indicates stronger creditor rights.
The laws against insider stealing and creditor rights we measure involve countries’ corporate and
bankruptcy laws, which are generally mandated based on the location of the project. As Bebchuk and
Guzman note, the dominant approach to transnational bankruptcies is territorial (Bebchuk & Guzman
1999). Though international loan agreements frequently include a choice of law clause selecting U.K. or
New York law (or the law of some other mature commercial jurisdiction) (Novo 2007), this choice of
governing law affects only the construction of the credit contract, and not the laws we measure—
shareholder rights and creditor rights in bankruptcy. Moreover, the creditor rights we measure have far
greater impact on creditor recoveries than the relatively marginal advantages of New York’s substantive
law on financial contracts, such as limitations on lender liability (Eisenberg & Miller 2009).

VI.

Results
We undertake a step-wise analysis to infer a causal relationship between country-level laws and

the deal-level choice between PF and CDF. We first offer preliminary evidence favoring our hypotheses
in the form of univariate tests. Second, we present the results of difference-in-difference tests exploiting
exogenous country-level changes in investor protection laws. We support these results with a number of
robustness checks to address potential endogeneity concerns. Third, to highlight a causal mechanism for
our results, we run triple-difference tests to investigate inter-industry differences—based on industry-level
free cash flow—in the effect of investor protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. Finally, we discuss
potential sample selection concerns.

A.

Preliminary Evidence
Figure 1 plots the percentage of PF in a country against creditor rights in each country. The graph

illustrates that the percentage of PF is negatively associated with the level of creditor rights. This
univariate finding is consistent with our Hypothesis 1. Similarly, Figure 2 plots the percentage of PF
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against the proxy for protection against insider stealing. As with the level of creditor rights, this graph
shows that the percentage of PF is negatively associated with our proxy for protection against insider
stealing, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Table 2 also offers data consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. It
shows that the likelihood of PF relative to CDF is considerably higher in the French legal origin countries
than in the English legal origin countries: 55% versus 36%. Even when we exclude the U.S. observations,
we find this difference to be quite significant: 55% versus 37%. Since investor protection laws are weaker
in French than in the English legal origin countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998), this is consistent with
our view that investor protection laws may be important in determining the choice of PF versus CDF.

B.

Difference-in-Difference Tests
Inferring a causal relationship between PF and investor protection laws presents a challenge

insofar as the relationship may be driven by country-level unobserved factors.8 First, country-level laws
governing insider stealing and creditor rights may be correlated with other country-level unobserved
factors. For example, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that PF is more likely in countries with
higher political and economic risks. The incidence of PF in a country may also be correlated with its time
varying economic growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010). Second, agency cost considerations are not the
sole motivation for PF. Proving our agency cost story requires that we account for other possible
motivations as well – most importantly, those relating to asset choice, debt overhang, and risk
management (Esty 2003). Third, since we have to rely on bank loans for our study, potential sample
selection problems could hobble our analysis. Fourth, differences in tax rates and tax treatment of debt
across different countries may affect the choice of PF.
To identify the causal effect of investor protection on the incidence of PF, we exploit exogenous
country-level changes in creditor rights and in shareholders' right to bring derivative suits.

8

We run unreported logit regressions for the likelihood of PF, obtaining evidence consistent with Figures 1-2.
However, the possibility of country-level unobserved factors precludes us from drawing strong conclusions from
these tests concerning our hypothesized effects.
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Countries differ with respect to the rights they offer creditors during bankruptcy. The DMS
creditor rights index assigns each country an index value from 0 to 4 based on how many of the following
four creditor rights are recognized in bankruptcy: (i) no automatic stay applies to secured creditors' rights;
(ii) secured creditors are paid first in bankruptcy; (iii) no majority creditor consent is required to initiate
bankruptcy; and (iv) management is automatically ousted upon bankruptcy. Panel A of Table 4 shows the
countries that underwent a change in creditor rights during our sample period. This list is drawn from
Appendix A of Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007).
Wider availability of shareholder derivative suits imposes stronger constraints on insider stealing,
and this legal feature is included as a component of the DLLS index of ex-post private control of selfdealing. A shareholder derivative suit is an action brought by a shareholder of a company in the name and
on behalf of that company in order to seek redress for a harm done to the company by the company's
directors or officers.9 Some countries restrict such suits based on the size of the putative shareholderplaintiff's holdings in the firm. Others may impose a demand requirement, which forces the shareholder
first to petition the company's board for redress before suit may proceed.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the countries that underwent a change in shareholders' right to bring
derivative suits. This list is constructed from Siems et. al. (2008), as well as searches for changes in these
laws in our sample countries through Lexis-Nexis Global. All these countries improved shareholders'
derivative suit rights during our sample period. Three countries—Germany, Italy and Mexico—lowered
the minimum ownership requirements for shareholders to file derivative suits, while Australia and Chile
instituted the mechanism of shareholder derivative suits. Since the countries that effected changes in
creditor rights do not overlap with countries that changed shareholder derivative suit rights, we can
cleanly infer the effect of each of these changes.

9

Because the firm's top managers–who ordinarily decide for the company who it will or will not sue–cannot
generally be expected to subject themselves to suit by the company, shareholders are given the right to sue
management in the company's name. Such an action is "derivative" in the sense that the right to sue belongs not to
the party actually bringing the action, but is `derived' from the company's rights. Given that it is the company's rights
that are sought to be vindicated in such an action, the proceeds of a successful action are awarded to the corporation
and not to the individual shareholders that initiated the suit.
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Figure 3 depicts the difference-in-difference of the effect of increases in creditor rights on the
percentage of PF to CDF at the country level while Figure 4 depicts the difference-in-difference effect of
increases in shareholder derivative suit rights on the percentage of PF to CDF at the country level. In
these figures, we plot the residuals from a regression of the percentage of PF on country and year fixed
effects. Year 0 corresponds to the year of the legal change. Year -1 is one year before the legal change,
and Year 1 is one year after the legal change, and so on. For each legal change in the treatment country,
we define year 0 for the control group of countries as the year when the legal change happened in the
treatment country; years -5 to +5 are then defined accordingly for each legal change. We then average by
event year the percentage of PF for the treatment and control groups separately. In both figures, we notice
that the time trend in the percentage of PF before the legal change is very similar for the treatment and
control groups, which suggests that in the absence of the legal change, the trends for the percentage of PF
in both groups would have been similar. Thus, figures 3 and 4 show that the key identifying assumption
for a difference-in-difference estimation appears to hold in our sample. Moreover, we notice in Figures 3
and 4 that the percentage of PF decreased following increases in investor protection.

1.

Panel Regressions
We implement the econometric variants of Figures 3 and 4 to test for the effect of changes in

investor protection laws using the following regression:
(1)

where y

prob y

= 1 = β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β ∗ DerivativeSuitRules + ϵ

is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank loan deal to borrower k in country c in year t is

PF and 0 if the deal corresponds to a capital expenditure loan or a corporate purpose term loan (our two
categories of CDF loans). CreditorRights
DerivativeSuitRules

is defined as in Djankov, McLeish and Shleifer (2007).

equals one for the years after a change occurs in the law governing shareholder

derivative suits in the countries listed in panel B of table 4, and equals zero otherwise. β and β denote
borrower and year fixed effects respectively. Since a borrower's country and industry do not change
through time, borrower fixed effects subsume the country and industry fixed effects.

15

Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we predict that β , β <0, which we test in Table 5. In all our
tests in Table 5, we compute cluster-robust standard errors using the cluster-correlated Huber-White
covariance matrix method, where we cluster by country. Column (1) of Table 5 tests specification (1)
above. In Column (2), we repeat specification (1) but include (country * industry) fixed effects instead of
borrower fixed effects. While all our other specifications use 2-digit SIC industry definitions, in this
specification we define industries as per Panel B of Table 1 to avoid an extraordinarily large number of
dummies. In both Columns (1) and (2), we find that β <0 and β <0 and are statistically significant,
thereby confirming Hypotheses 1 and 2.
We next aggregate deals at the 2-digit SIC level i in country c in year t and estimate an OLS
regression that includes country, year and industry fixed effects:
(2)

y

= β + β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β ∗ DerivativeSuitRules + ϵ

Column (3) of Table 5 shows that our results remain strong in this specification. Using Columns (1)-(3),
we estimate the economic effect as follows. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change, an
increase in creditor rights decreased the likelihood of PF by at least 4.4% and at most by 7.2%; a decrease
in creditor rights increased the likelihood of PF similarly. Given the baseline PF percentage of 42%, these
differences are economically significant. Compared to countries that did not undergo a change in rules
governing derivative suits, the increase in shareholder protection in the countries in our sample decreased
the likelihood of PF by at least 9.1% and at most by 13.7%. Again, given the baseline PF percentage of
42%, these differences are economically significant.
A potential source of bias stems from the possibility that weak investor protection may cause
sponsors to forego projects. Since the set of foregone projects is not observable and this set would
contract with an increase in investor protection, this dynamic could account for our results by simply
increasing the number of CDF deals, even if PF were not a substitute for CDF (and therefore the choice of
PF versus CDF would not vary with investor protection). We test for this potential bias by examining the
effect of changes in investor protection on the number of PF deals, which should move inversely with
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investor protection if our hypotheses are correct, but may not move at all if sampling bias from foregone
projects is at work. In Column (4) of Table 5, we use the log of the number of PF deals in a country,
industry, year as the dependent variable. We find that the number of PF deals does move inversely with
investor protection laws. While a creditor rights change leads to a 14.6% change in the number of PF
deals (= e-0.158 -1), a change in rules governing shareholder lawsuits changes the number of PF deals by
7.0% (= e-0.073 -1). In Column (5) of Table 5, to control for the possibility that the number of PF deals may
be greater in larger countries, we normalize the number of PF deals in a country, industry, year by the
country GDP in the particular year. This normalization also enables us to control for the possibility that
firms in civil law countries may not use the syndicated loan market for CDF loans as much as firms in
common law countries. This may be the case if relationship banking is more likely in civil law countries
because loans from relationship banks are less likely to be syndicated. From Columns (4) and (5) of Table
5, we conclude that the hypothesized effects remain strong using these alternative measures.
Finally, to alleviate concerns that industry-level shocks may be driving our results, in unreported
tests, we re-examine the above specifications by replacing the year fixed effects with industry*year fixed
effects. Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged.

2.

Time-Varying Control Variables
The tests in Table 5 control for several time-varying sources of heterogeneity. First, we include

several deal-level controls. The loan spread variable and the indicator variable for an unrated borrower
proxy for the various lender costs from asymmetric information relating to the borrower. Rated borrowers
are more transparent than unrated borrowers. As well, greater information asymmetry will cause the
lender to charge a higher interest rate in order to account for the higher risk. If asymmetric information
varies between PF and CDF loans, the loan spread variable and the dummy for unrated borrowers enable
us to control for these effects. The variable for loan amount enables us to capture the possible contagion
effect that higher debt can have on the sponsor’s solvency. Shah and Thakor (1987) argue that separate
incorporation, for example through PF, can mitigate this contagion effect. The loan amount variable
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controls for this motivation for PF. We also control for the loan’s maturity and include a dummy for
whether the loan is secured. Our deal-level tests in Columns (1) and (2) include these deal-level controls.
Our industry-level tests in Columns (3)-(5) include the averages of the deal-level variables as controls.
Among these variables, we find the secured loan dummy to be positively correlated with PF, which is
consistent with the greater risk associated with PF loans. We also find the senior loan dummy to be
negatively correlated with PF. This result is consistent with the lower verifiability of cash flows in CDF,
which causes CDF lenders to demand seniority. We also find loan maturity to be positively correlated
with PF, consistent with PF loans having longer initial terms than CDF loans.
Table 5 also includes several industry-level controls. To capture the agency costs of free cash
flow in an industry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), we follow Lang, Stulz, and Walking
(1999) by including the median ratio of free cash flow to assets for each 4-digit SIC industry. We find a
positive association between the likelihood of PF and industry free cash flow. We also include the median
ratio of tangible assets to total assets, the median Tobin's Q, and the median ratio of long term debt to
assets for each 4-digit SIC industry. We note that PF is positively associated with tangible-asset-intensive
industries and industries with greater leverage. We also control for the possibility that PF could be
advantageous in reducing the deadweight costs resulting from debt-equity conflicts that arise with CDF—
in particular, leverage-induced under-investment or debt overhang. These deadweight costs arise when a
firm has high leverage and significant growth opportunities, so we capture the extent of these deadweight
costs at the industry level with our interaction of long term debt to assets with Tobin's Q. The positive
coefficient on this interaction implies that PF is associated with industries with greater deadweight costs
from such debt-equity conflicts. While the coefficient of long term debt to assets is also significant
independent of the interaction, the effect of Tobin's Q is absorbed completely in its interaction with long
term debt to assets. This suggests that while leverage is correlated with the choice of PF over and above
the deadweight costs from debt-equity conflicts, growth opportunities are associated with PF primarily
through their effect on debt-equity conflicts.
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Finally, we include country-level controls. We capture time-varying influences of economic
growth using the log of GDP per capita and time-varying availability of debt financing at the macro level
using the log of private credit to GDP per capita. We find that the likelihood of PF is positively correlated
with economic growth, consistent with the findings in Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010). However, the
availability of debt financing does not seem to correlate with the likelihood of PF, which alleviates
concerns that omitted variables related to changes in credit availability are driving our results.

3.

Discussion
The difference-in-difference tests above alleviate important endogeneity concerns, since the tests

exploit variation across time in the choice of PF versus CDF within a given industry in a given country.
The tests thus compare deals with similar assets in the same country, before and after a law change,
against a control group of deals that involve no such law change. First, the within-country variation that
we exploit ensures that our results are not driven by time-invariant differences across countries in political
or economic risk. Second, including fixed effects for each (country*industry) pair accounts for any
unobserved differences in the choice of PF due to: (i) any country specialization with respect to asset
choice or industries that might be correlated with investor protection; or (ii) different effective tax rates
and tax treatment of debt across different industries within a country. Third, as explained in Section 6.5,
these tests account for selection biases that do not vary with time. These tests therefore provide strong
evidence that our results are not driven by endogenous country-level or country- and industry-level
factors.

C.

Robustness Tests.

1.

Tests Excluding U.S. and U.K. Observations
One potential concern may be that our results are driven by the disproportionate number of U.S.

and U.K. observations in our sample as the control group. To address this possibility, in unreported tests,
we replicate the tests in Table 5 after excluding all U.S. observations, and then after separately excluding
all U.K. observations. Our results remain unchanged.
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2.

Separate Effects Of Creditor Rights Increases/Decreases
As seen in Table 4, our sample includes countries that experienced increases in creditor rights as

well as those that experienced decreases. We therefore test separately for the effects of increases and
decreases on the choice of PF versus CDF. We interact the creditor rights variable with a dummy for
countries that experienced a decrease in creditor rights and also with a dummy for countries that
experienced an increase. In unreported tests, we find evidence consistent with our hypotheses for both
increases and decreases. The economic effect of creditor rights decreases is greater than for creditor rights
increases by at least 40%.

3.

Dynamic Effects of Exogenous Legal Changes
Given the absence of a differential time trend before the legal changes as demonstrated in Figures

3 and 4 and the lack of correlation between the timing of legal changes and pre-existing patterns of PF,
we infer that the legal changes are exogenous to our variable of interest. Nevertheless, we examine the
dynamics of the effect of the legal changes on the choice of PF versus CDF for possible reverse causality.
We follow Bertrand and Mulainathan (2003) and decompose the period surrounding a change in creditor
rights into three separate subperiods: (i) Forwarded Creditor Rights Change, which captures any effect
from two years to one year before the change); (ii) Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change, which
captures the effect in the year of and year after the change); and (iii) Lagged Creditor Rights Change,
which captures the effect two years after the change and beyond. Similarly, we decompose the change in
laws governing shareholder derivatives suits into Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules,
Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules, and Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules. If the
coefficient of Forwarded Creditor Rights Change or Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules is
negative and statistically significant, that may be symptomatic of reverse causation. However in Table 6,
we find that the coefficients for these variables are not statistically significant, which implies that reverse
causality may not be a material concern.
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We do find crucially that the coefficients of the Contemporaneous and Lagged variables are
negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients for Lagged Creditor Rights Change and
Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules are consistently larger (in absolute value) than for
Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change and Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules,
respectively, which implies that the long-run effects of the legal changes are larger than their immediate
effects. In fact, the long-run effects are at least 80% greater than the immediate effects.
The absence of reverse causality should not be surprising in our setting because influencing PF is
usually not a priority that drives regulatory/legal change. As a result, it is unlikely that legal changes were
effected to influence the choice of PF versus CDF. Neither is it likely that omitted variables that influence
the choice of PF versus CDF were correlated with the legal changes. Together these various tests strongly
imply that any effects on the likelihood of PF following the legal changes can plausibly be attributed to
the legal changes themselves.

D.

Triple-difference Tests
To highlight a causal mechanism for our results so far – cash flow verifiability in PF – we

investigate inter-industry differences, based on industry-level free cash flows, in the effect of investor
protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. We estimate the following model:
(3)

prob y

FCF/Assets

where y
β

→

,

=1 =β

→

+ β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β2 ∗ DerivativeSuitRulesct + β

∗

+ϵ

is defined as in (1) before. β

denotes the fixed effects for each (country, year) pair while

denotes fixed effects for the 2-digit SIC industry. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we

instrument for industry-level free cash flow in a given country using the median ratio of free cash flow to
assets for each 2-digit SIC industry in the U.S. in a given year. Industry-level free cash flow in a given
sample country may be endogenous, since industrial patterns in a country may be correlated
systematically with country-wide unobserved factors. However, U.S. industry free cash flow is unlikely to
be correlated with unobserved determinants of the dependent variable. At the same time, for technological
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reasons, a U.S. industry cash flow measure is likely to be correlated with cash flow for the same industry
in a different country, making it a useful instrument for capturing the extent to which cash flows may be
diverted in a particular industry.10 We exclude observations for U.S. deals to avoid spurious correlation.
This specification offers our strongest evidence on the causal effect of changes in investor
protection on the choice of PF versus CDF. First, the inclusion of fixed effects for each (country, year)
pair enables us to control for the effect of any omitted variables at the country level that may be correlated
with the changes in investor protection. Changes in investor protection may have coincided with other
changes in a given country. For example, the incidence of PF in a country correlates with its economic
growth (Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010), and economic growth may correlate with changes in investor
protection laws as well. The inclusion of (country, year) fixed effects soaks up such confounding factors.
Consistent with Figures 3 and 4, which suggest the absence of differential trends in the treatment and
control groups of countries, these fixed effects enable us to directly control for possible differential
trends, and thereby to identify the causal effect of the legal changes.
Moreover, if such biases were to vary at the (country, industry, year) level, because we interact
the changes in investor protection with U.S. industry measures of free cash flow to assets, these biases are
unlikely to vary with the explanatory variable of interest. β and β measure as a triple-difference the
effect of the legal changes on PF. As earlier noted, we expect the effects of investor protection to be
stronger in industries with greater free cash flows. Therefore, we expect β , β <0. In our tests in Table 7,
we compute cluster-robust standard errors using the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix
method, clustering at the country level. In addition, since the number of treatment clusters (country * twodigit SIC) is large, we use the asymptotic t-distribution for the tests of significance. Column (1) of Table
7 presents the results of the logit regression in equation (3). In Column (3), we aggregate deals at a broad
industry level as described in Panel B of Table 1, in country c in year t using an OLS regression:

10

The proportion of tangible assets in an industry could be an alternative measure for the extent to which cash flows
could be diverted. However, since an increase in tangible assets also increases the borrower's ability to pledge assets
as collateral for loans, increased tangibility does not offer as clean an interpretation as an increase in ability to divert
cash flows.
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y

(4)
Assets

,

= β + β + β ∗ CreditorRights + β2 ∗ DerivativeSuitRulesct + β

∗ FCF/

+ϵ

where FCF/Assets

,

equals the median ratio of free cash flow to assets for the broad industry in the

U.S. in a given year. The coefficients in Columns (1) and (3) confirm that β and β are negative and
statistically significant, which suggests that legal changes have a disproportionate effect on the choice of
PF versus CDF in industries where the agency costs of free cash flow are greater. These results are
consistent with Hypothesis 3. To ascertain the economic magnitude of the effect, consider two industries:
one for which the ratio of free cash flow to assets is equal to the mean (0.14) and another for which the
ratio of free cash flow to assets is one standard deviation greater than the mean (0.31). The economic
effect of a change in investor protection in the industry with higher free cash flows would be about 120%
(=0.31/0.14 – 1) greater than in the industry with lower free cash flows.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 7 present the results of the regressions in equations (3) and (4),
respectively, where FCF/Assets

,

is replaced with Tangibility

,

. These results show that while β is

negative and statistically significant, β is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the legal
changes have a disproportionately smaller effect on the choice of PF versus CDF in industries where the
tangible assets are greater, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4. For an industry with asset tangibility
one standard deviation greater than the mean (0.72 versus 0.35), the economic effect of a change in
investor protection is about 106% (=0.72/0.35 – 1) smaller than the effect in the industry at the mean.

E.

Addressing Sample Selection Concerns
The exogenous legal changes also enable us to use the difference-in-difference and triple-

difference tests to address sample selection issues that might potentially bias our results.

1.

Counting Financing Deals versus Counting Projects
First, our sample is comprised of financing deals, as opposed to projects, and we implicitly

assume a one-to-one correspondence between financing deals and projects. It is possible, however, that
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this assumption is incorrect. For example, CDF projects might sometimes require more than one round of
financing, and the number of rounds might vary with investor protection. In that case, our count of CDF
deals would overstate the likelihood of CDF by treating multiple financings of the same project as
separate financings for separate projects. However, our difference-in-difference tests using exogenous
country-level legal changes mitigate this concern. First, our within-country analysis ensures that our
results are not an artifact of time-invariant differences across countries. Second, any time-invariant biases
that manifest differently across different industries in different countries are also captured by our
(country*industry) fixed effects in Column (2) of Tables 5-6. To the extent that the effects of sample
selection bias of this nature do not change significantly across time, the difference-in-difference tests
provide robust evidence that such bias does not drive our results.
It might still be possible that sample selection problems explain our results of Tables 5-7 if such
biases coincide with the country-level legal changes we test. We test directly for this possible sample
selection bias in Table 8. If a legal change affected the number of CDF financing rounds per project, we
should observe changes in the average maturity for CDF loans following a legal change. Column (1) of
Table 8 shows no significant change in CDF loan maturity following a legal change. Therefore, we
conclude that this sample selection problem is unlikely to be driving our results.

2.

Alternatives to CDF
A second sample selection concern involves the existence of financing alternatives to CDF

besides PF that we have not considered in our analysis. Equity financing, public debt, and internal
financing at the sponsor level may also be potential alternatives to CDF. If the choice between CDF and
any of these alternatives varies with investor protection, this could bias our results. First, consider equity
financing. Since dispersed equity is relatively unattractive to investors in countries with weak investor
protection, equity financing is relatively more likely to displace PF in countries with strong investor
protection. Therefore, we are likely to undercount the equity-financed alternatives to PF by a greater
margin in countries with stronger investor protection. Consequently, compared to the use of PF in the
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population, our neglect of equity financing possibilities leads us to overestimate the likelihood of PF in
countries with strong investor protection. But our hypothesis is that PF is used relatively less in countries
with strong investor protection, so this bias works against our hypothesis. In a similar vein, dispersed
public debt offers a practical alternative to PF only in countries with well-developed corporate bond
markets, which are correlated with strong investor protection as well. Therefore, as with the equity
financing alternative, the public debt alternative also stacks the odds against our finding results consistent
with our central hypothesis.
Finally, consider internal financing. We anticipate two offsetting dynamics here. First, in
countries with weak investor protection, managers are more likely to steal, which may make internal
financing less likely because managers would rather steal free cash than invest it. Second, in weak legal
regimes, information asymmetry may be severe, causing external financing alternatives to be scarce and
leaving internal financing as the only alternative. Thus, the overall effect of investor protection on internal
financing may be positive or negative. Irrespective of this net effect, our difference-in-difference tests in
Tables 5-6 control for any time-invariant levels of over- or under-estimation in the percentage of PF deals
at both the country-level and the country-industry level.
It is possible that following the legal changes we identify, firms altered the proportion of projects
that were internally financed. To investigate this possibility, we test using the subsample of our borrower
firms for which financial data are available in Global Compustat. Since Rajan and Zingales (1998) define
external financing as one minus the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures, we use
the ratio of Cash Flow from Operations to Capital Expenditures as our measure of internal financing.11
Column (2) of Table 8 shows the results of our tests, which include firm and year fixed effects. We find
that changes in investor protection had no significant effect on internal financing employed by firms in
our sample. Therefore, our primary findings are not an artifact of under- or over-estimation of the
likelihood of PF from a failure to consider internal financing as an alternative financing device.

11

As in Rajan and Zingales (1998), cash flow from operations equals Compustat cash flow from operations plus
decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables.
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3.

Deal Size and Dealscan
Finally, besides affecting the choice of PF versus CDF, investor protection might also affect deal

size in a way that biases our results, because the Dealscan database includes only large deals. Suppose
that creditor rights do not affect the likelihood of PF at all, but instead are positively correlated with CDF
loan size. CDF might be as likely relative to PF in countries with weak creditor rights as those with strong
creditor rights, but the smaller CDF loans in weaker creditor rights countries would drop out of Dealscan's
coverage, biasing our sample in favor of our hypotheses. Our tests would be affected only if this
(unobserved) sampling bias is correlated not only with the legal changes but also with the interaction of
the legal changes with the U.S. measure of free cash flow to assets. Nevertheless, we test for this
possibility using the logarithm of deal size as the dependent variable. The results in Column (3) of Table
8 show no significant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes. In unreported tests, we also
investigate whether the legal changes affect deal size for the separate subsamples of PF and CDF loans.
We find no statistically significant change in deal size coinciding with the legal changes for either subsample. Therefore, we do not believe our results are driven by this sampling criterion.
In sum, our difference-in difference and triple-difference tests relying on exogenous legal
changes as well as exogenous inter-industry variation induced by these legal changes enable us to
mitigate endogeneity concerns as well as sample selection concerns. Our tests therefore provide strong
support for the causal effect of investor protection laws on the choice of PF versus CDF.

VII.

Distinguishing PF from Related Mechanisms
We have explained PF as a unique arrangement with both organizational and contractual features

that work in tandem to offer a private substitute for investor protection laws by making Project cash flows
verifiable. Here, we distinguish PF from related organizational and contractual mechanisms, which offer
features similar to PF, but which are by themselves insufficient to make cash flows verifiable.
Separate legal incorporation significantly reduces the cost and difficulty of monitoring
managerial actions. However, what is also essential to PF is that the sponsor own and operate only a
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single, discrete project. Only this combination of separate incorporation and a single project enables
transparent cash flow separation. A subsidiary with multiple projects, for example, offers no advantage as
to cash flow separation and monitoring compared to the parent. Rather than monitoring commingled cash
flows from numerous assets, and trying to sort out noisy signals on managerial skill, the PF lender
monitors relatively simple cash flow streams from a single asset. If the subsidiary company houses
multiple projects, the extensive contractual constraints on cash flow necessary to effective monitoring are
as costly to the subsidiary as they are to the corporate parent in terms of lost managerial flexibility.
CDF in the form of secured debt offers some of the advantages of PF, but, again, is not a
substitute. Secured debt with high leverage (SDHL), for example, offers two advantages of PF. SDHL
collateralizes corporate debt with specific assets in the same way that PF does. The high leverage also
reduces agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the amount of free cash a manager has available in
any period. What SDHL misses, however is cash flow verifiability and concomitant control of the cash.
With PF, very little cash is likely ever to be free cash. Even after project expenses and scheduled debt
service have been paid in a given period, the cash flow waterfall arrangement dictates the use of any
remaining cash. The waterfall arrangement adjusts to absorb any free cash, whether the project generates
more or less cash flow than originally anticipated. The standard excess cash flow sweep covenant of
Corporate Debt cannot effect the finely tuned cash management embodied in the cash flow waterfall
arrangement of PF. Therefore, SDHL cannot explain our main hypothesis – the inverse relationship
between the likelihood of PF and the strength of legal protections for outside investors.
Finally, PF requires this tight control of cash since the lender can look only to project cash flows
for repayment. More so than with CDF, where multiple projects and growth opportunities offer some risk
diversification, the PF lender must guard against the possibility that future cash flows may be poor. This
vigilance requires the cash flow waterfall arrangement with its multiple lender-monitored cash accounts.
This feature further distinguishes PF from subsidiary incorporation with multiple projects and SDHL.
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VIII. Conclusion
We investigate Project Finance as a private response to inefficiencies created by weak legal
protection of outside investors. For large investment projects, Project Finance offers a contractual and
organizational substitute for investor protection laws by making cash flows verifiable, thereby enhancing
debt capacity. Project Finance makes cash flows verifiable through: (i) contractual arrangements made
possible by structuring the Project Company as a single, discrete project legally separate from the
sponsor; and (ii) private enforcement of these contracts through a network of project accounts that ensures
lender control of project cash flows. Comparing the incidence of bank loans for Project Finance with
regular corporate loans for large investments ("Corporate Debt Finance"), we show that Project Finance is
more likely in countries with weaker laws against insider stealing and weaker creditor rights laws.
While we focus on private debt alternatives to Project Finance, our results may have broader
implications. In weak legal environments, Project Finance may be preferable not only to Corporate Debt
Finance, but also to equity and public debt finance since weak investor protection laws reduce their
attractiveness. If this conjecture holds, then our findings may extend to the choice of Project Finance
versus external Corporate Finance in general. This is an interesting question for future study.

28

References
Angrist, J.D and J-S. Pischke. 2008. Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion.
Princeton University Press.
Bebchuk, L. A. and Guzman, A.T., 1999, “An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcy,”
Journal of Law and Economics, 42, 775-808.
Berkovitch, E. and Kim E. H., 1990, "Financial Contracting and Leverage Induced Over- and UnderInvestment Incentives," Journal of Finance, 45(3), 765-794.
Bertrand, M., and Mulainathan, S., 2003, “Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and
Managerial Preferences,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1043-1075.
Borgonovo, E. and Gatti, S., 2013, “Risk analysis with contractual default. Does covenant breach
matter?” Working paper.
Cameron, A. Colin, Douglas Miller, and Jonah B. Gelbach, 2008, “Bootstrapped-Based
Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(3), 414427.
Chemmanur, T. J. and John, K., 1996, "Optimal Incorporation, Structure of Debt Contracts, and
Limited-Recourse Project Financing," Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5(4), 372-408.
Coase, Ronald H., 1960, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1), 1–44.
Coffee, J. C., 1999. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and its Implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93, 641-708.
Coffee, J. C., 2007a. Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement. University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, 156, 229-311.
Corielli, F.; Gatti, S. and Steffanoni, A. (2010), Risk Shifting through Nonfinancial Contracts: Effects
on Loan Spreads and Capital Structure of Project Finance Deals, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
42(7), 1295-1320.
Diamond, Douglas, 2004, "Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt when Enforcement is Costly,"
Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1447-1479.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2006, "The law and economics of
self-dealing," Journal of Financial Economics.
Djankov, S., McLeish, C. and Shleifer, A., 2007, "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of
Financial Economics, 84, 299-329.
Eisenberg, T. and Miller, G.P., 2009, “The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of
Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts,” Cardozo Law Review, 30,
1475.
Esty, B. C., 2003, "The economic motivations for using project finance," Working Paper.

29

Esty, B. C. and Megginson, W. L., 2003, "Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt ownership structure:
Evidence from the global syndicated loan market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38,
37-59.
Esty, Benjamin C. and Aldo Sesia, Jr., 2007, "An overview of project finance & infrastructure finance
– 2006 update," Harvard Business School Teaching Note 9-207-107.
Freedom House, 2007. "Annual freedom in the world survey: political rights and civil liberties rating
1972-2006," http://www.freedomhouse.org.
Gatti, S., Kleimeier, S., Megginson, W.L., Steffanoni, A., “Arranger Certification in Project Finance,”
Financial Management, Spring 2013, 1-40.
Hart, Oliver. 1995. "Firms, contracts, and financial structure," Clarendon Press.
Hainz, C. and Kleimeier, S., 2012, “Political risk, project finance, and the participation of
development banks in syndicated lending,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, 287-314.
Jensen, M. C., 1986, "The agency costs of free cash flow," American Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H., 1976, "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Karolyi, A., 1998. Why do companies list their shares abroad? A survey of the evidence and its
managerial implications. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 7, 1-60.
Karolyi, A., 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world: Challenging
conventional wisdom. Review of Finance 10, 99-152.
Karolyi, A., 2010. Corporate Governance, Agency Problems and International Cross-listings: A
Defense of the Bonding Hypothesis, Cornell University Working Paper.
Kleimeier, S., and Megginson, W.L., 2000, "Are Project Finance Loans Different From Other
Syndicated Credits?," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 12, 75-87.
Kleimeier, S., and Veersteeg, R., 2010, “Project Finance as a Driver of Economic Growth in LowIncome Countries,” Review of Financial Economics, 19, 49-59.
Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R. M., and Walking, R. A., 1999, "A test of free cash flow hypothesis: The case
of bidder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, 29, 315-339.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1997, "Legal determinants of
external finance," Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-1150.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, 1998, "Law and finance," Journal
of Political Economy, 101, 678-709.
Nevitt Peter K. and Frank J. Fabozzi, 2000, "Project Financing," Euromoney Books.
Novo, M., 2007, “Legal Aspects of Project Finance,” in Gatti S., Project Finance in Theory and
Practice, 233-287. Academic Press.

30

Qian, J. and Strahan, P. E., 2007, "How laws and institutions shape financial contracts: The case of
bank loans," Journal of Finance, 62(6), 2803-2834.
Rajan, R.G., and Zingales, L., 1998, "Financial dependence and growth," American Economic
Review, 88(3), 559-586.
Shah, S. and Thakor, A. V., 1987, "Optimal capital structure and project financing," Journal of
Economic Theory, 42(2), 209-243.
Shleifer, A. and Wolfenzon, D., 2002, "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial
Economics, 66, 3-57.
Siems, M. P. Lele, P. Iglesias-Rodriguez, V. Mollica, T. Klauberg and S. Heidenhain. 2008. "CBR
Extended Shareholder Protection Index," Working Paper, University of Cambridge.
Spamann, H., 2010, “The ‘Antidirector Rights Index’ Revisited,” Review of Financial Studies, 23(2),
467-486.
Stulz, R., 1999. Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance 26, 3-28.

31

Figure 1: Percentage of Project Finance by Country versus Creditor Rights
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The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country while the x-axis plots the DMS
creditor rights. Higher values indicate greater creditor rights.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Project Finance by Country versus Protection Against Insider
Stealing

.8
.6
.4
.2
0

Percentage of Project Finance

1

The y-axis plots the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country while the x-axis plots the DLLS
(2006) proxy for protection against insider stealing. Higher values for the x-variable indicate greater
protection against insider stealing.
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Figure 3: Effect of Exogenous Creditor Rights Changes on Project Finance

Residuals from Regression of % of Project
Finance on Country Fixed Effects

For each figure below, the y-axis plots the residuals from the regression of the percentage of Project
Finance deals in a country on country and year fixed effects for: (i) countries experiencing an increase
(decrease) in Creditor Rights; and (ii) countries without a change in creditor rights, i.e. the set of countries
not included in panel A of table 4. The top figure shows the effect for countries with creditor rights
increases, while the bottom figure shows the effect for countries with creditor rights decreases. The x-axis
represents years before/after a legal change. For each country experiencing a creditor rights change, the
year 0 for the control group of countries is defined as the year of the change in the treatment country. For
each of the years from -5 to 5, the values for that year are averaged across the control group of countries.
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Figure 4: Effect of Exogenous Increases in Shareholder Derivative Suit Rights
on Project Finance

Residuals from Regression of % of Project
Finance on Country Fixed Effects

The y-axis plots the residuals from the regression of the percentage of Project Finance deals in a country
on country and year fixed effects for: (i) countries experiencing an increase in Shareholder Derivative
Suit Rights; and (ii) countries without a change in rules governing shareholder derivatives suits, i.e. the
set of countries not included in panel B of table 4. The x-axis represents years before/after a legal change.
For each country experiencing an increase in Shareholder Derivative Suit Rights, the year 0 for the
control group of countries is defined as the year of the change in the treatment country. For each of the
years from -5 to 5, the values for that year are averaged across the control group of countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Features of Project Finance and Corporate Debt Finance Deals
Project
Summary Statistic
Finance
Observations
7763
Deal Amount (in $ millions)
Mean
255.2
Median
123.9
Std. Devn.
482.2
Minimum
10
Maximum
10513.8
Maturity (in years)
Mean
10.7
Median
10.6
Std. Devn.
0.7
Minimum
9.5
Maximum
20.0
Number of Lenders
Mean
7.1
Median
4
Std. Devn.
7.4
Minimum
1
Maximum
50

Capital
Expenditures
2351

Corporate
Purpose
Term Loans
8327

215.5
155.0
597.9
10
10586.3

244.4
100.0
635.1
10
10588.9

10.5
10.5
0.4
9.5
12.8

10.4
10.4
0.4
9.5
12.8

5.3
3
6.1
1
48

5
3
6.4
1
97

Panel B: Project and Corporate Debt Finance Deals by Industry
Industry Description
Construction
Manufacturing
Mining
Real Estate, Insurance
and Other Finance
Retail/Wholesale/Distributors
Services
Transportation

SIC
Codes

Corporate
Debt Finance

Project
Finance

Total

15-17
20-39
10-14

188
3702
566

888
1392
674

1076
5094
1240

%
Project
Finance
83%
27%
54%

60-67
50-59
70-89
40-49

1564
1127
1929
1602

1121
224
727
2737

2685
1351
2656
4339

42%
17%
27%
63%

Panel C: Summary Statistics for the Main Explanatory Variables

Ex-post private control of self-dealing
Creditor Rights
Change in Derivative Suit Rules
Creditor Rights Change
Free Cash Flow to Assets
Asset Tangibility

Observations

Mean

18257
18257
18257
18257
18257
18257

0.87
1.54
0.18
0.07
0.14
0.35

35

Std.
Devn.
0.19
1.00
0.25
0.13
0.17
0.37

Minimum

Maximum

0.09
0
0
0
-2
0

1
4
1
1
2
1

Table 2: Distribution of Project Finance and Corporate Debt Finance by Country

English:
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong
Israel
Ireland
Malaysia
New Zealand
Singapore
South Africa
Thailand
USA
United Kingdom
All English Legal Origin
All English Legal Origin excluding U.S.
French:
Argentina
Belgium
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Egypt
France
Greece
Indonesia
Italy
Lithuania
Mexico
Netherlands
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Turkey
Venezuela
All French Legal Origin
German:
Bulgaria
Germany
Japan
Korea (South)
Switzerland
Taiwan
All German Legal Origin:

Total

Corporate
Finance

884
534
688
30
145
440
125
294
120
386
5184
1992
10822
5638

Project
Finance

%
Project
Finance

393
437
437
19
65
199
60
167
56
227
3461
1553
7074
3613

521
97
281
11
80
265
65
127
64
159
1823
439
3932
2109

59%
18%
41%
37%
55%
60%
52%
43%
53%
41%
35%
22%
36%
37%

146
100
108
118
180
150
118
106
562
858

65
55
49
51
90
70
68
56
247
411

81
45
59
67
90
80
50
50
315
447

55%
45%
55%
57%
50%
53%
42%
47%
56%
52%

30
986
104
338
105

15
463
54
141
39

15
523
50
197
66

50%
53%
48%
58%
63%

60
292
250
190
4801

28
87
100
60
2149

32
205
150
130
2652

53%
70%
60%
68%
55%

80
548
174
340
105
736
1983

44
317
133
163
70
353
1080

36
231
41
177
35
383
903

45%
42%
24%
52%
33%
52%
46%
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Debt

Scandinavian:
Finland
Norway
Sweden
All Scandinavian Legal Origin:
Socialist:
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Russia
All Socialist Legal Origin:
All Countries:

112
110
104
326

48
74
64
186

64
36
40
140

57%
33%
38%
43%

50
30
245
325
18257

31
19
139
189
10678

19
11
106
136
7763

38%
37%
43%
42%
42%

Table 3: Key Explanatory Variables
Variables

Description

Sources

Ex-post private control
of self-dealing

Index of ex-post control over self-dealing transactions. Average
of disclosure in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing

DLLS (2006)

Creditor Rights

An index aggregating four different credit rights: restrictions on
entering reorganization, no automatic stay on secured assets,
secured creditors first paid, and management is automatically
ousted.

DMS (2007)

Project Finance

Equals 1 if it is a non-recourse loan to finance a specific project,
0 if the loan is a Capital Expenditure loan or a Corporate
Purpose Term Loan

Dealscan

Capital
loan

A loan for capital expenditures purpose

Dealscan

Purpose

A term loan categorized as “Corporate Purposes” in Dealscan
with minimum loan amount (converted in dollars) $0.5mm

Dealscan

Free Cash Flow to
Assets (U.S.)

The median measure of free cash flow divided by book value of
assets, where the median is calculated for the 2-digit SIC industry
for U.S. firms. Free Cash Flow to Assets is computed as net
income plus depreciation and amortization minus capital
expenditures and increases in net working capital

Compustat

Expenditure

Corporate
Term Loan
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Table 4: Countries experiencing changes in legal investor protection
The list of countries with creditor rights changes is drawn from Appendix A of Djankov, S., McLeish, C.
and Shleifer, A. (2007). The list of countries with changes governing shareholder derivative suits is drawn
from Siems et al. (2008).
Panel A: Creditor Rights Changes

Panel B: Changes Governing Shareholder Derivative Suits

Country

Year

Increase/
Decrease?

Country

Year

Description of change

Azerbaijan

1997

Increase

Australia

2000

Instituted

Bulgaria

2000

Increase

Chile

2000

Indonesia

1998

Decrease

Germany

1998

Israel

1995

Decrease

Italy

1998

Japan

2000

Decrease

Mexico

2001

Instituted
Minimum share ownership required for enforcing
claims changed from 10% to 5%
Minimum share ownership required for enforcing
claims changed from 10% to 5%
Minimum share ownership required for enforcing
claims changed from 33% to 15%

2002
1997
1998
2001
1995
1998
1994
2003
1994
1998
2004
2004
1995
1999

Increase
Increase
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Increase
Decrease
Increase
Increase
Decrease
Decrease

Kazakhstan

Lithuania
Romania
Russia

Spain
Sweden
Thailand

38

Table 5: Difference-in-Difference Tests Using Exogenous Country-Level Legal Changes
All columns report results relating to creditor rights and changes in rules governing shareholder derivative
suits. Columns 1-2 report logit results using a deal-level sample with various fixed effects. Columns 3-5
report OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry and year fixed effects, and using
industry level averages of the deal level control variables. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the
cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method where the clustering is done at the country
level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is:
Sample:
Regression model:
Creditor Rights
Change in Derivative
Suit Rules
All in spread drawn
Log of Deal Amount
One if Secured
Maturity
One if Borrower
not rated
One if Senior
Free Cash Flow / Assets
Tangibility
Interest Expense /
Net Income
LT Debt / Total Assets
Tobin’s Q
LT Debt / Total Assets *
Tobin’s Q
Log of GDP per capita
Log of Private Credit
to GDP per capita
Borrower FE
(Country*Industry) FE
Country and Industry FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
Prob (PF=1)
Deal
Logit
Logit
-0.054***
-0.044***
(6.08)
(3.85)
-0.091***
-0.093***
(4.65)
(3.83)
0.012
0.008
(0.45)
(0.28)
0.004
0.002
(0.50)
(0.22)
0.021**
0.021**
(2.29)
(2.63)
0.134***
0.152***
(7.66)
(6.77)
0.042
0.038
(1.55)
(1.30)
-0.042
-0.05**
(1.70)
(2.14)
0.152***
0.113***
(5.85)
(5.55)
0.124**
0.096*
(2.67)
(1.82)
0.012
0.005
(1.44)
(0.59)
0.337***
0.23***
(4.36)
(3.70)
0.100
0.063
(1.06)
(0.70)
1.183***
1.017***
(8.42)
(7.03)
0.181**
0.194**
(2.47)
(2.72)
-0.030
-0.038
(0.71)
(1.08)
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
18257
18257
0.82
0.29

(3)
% PF
OLS
-0.072***
(5.17)
-0.137***
(4.85)
0.024
(0.23)
0.027
(0.14)
0.066**
(2.54)
0.165***
(6.60)
0.081
(1.19)
-0.024**
(2.08)
0.165***
(5.81)
0.173**
(2.64)
0.048
(1.37)
0.345***
(4.22)
0.120
(1.01)
0.859***
(8.16)
0.183**
(3.04)
-0.064
(1.29)
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
4515
0.42
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(4)
(5)
Ln (PF Loans)
Ln (PF Loans/GDP)
Industry, Country, Year
OLS
OLS
-0.158*
-0.075***
(3.50)
(3.25)
-0.073*
-0.135***
(3.26)
(3.18)
0.024
0.024
(0.24)
(0.23)
0.027
0.027
(0.14)
(0.15)
0.095**
0.072**
(2.61)
(2.56)
0.186***
0.193***
(6.58)
(6.63)
0.081
0.081
(1.20)
(1.16)
-0.029**
-0.024**
(2.12)
(2.08)
0.166***
0.172***
(5.86)
(5.78)
0.138**
0.125**
(2.52)
(2.54)
0.048
0.048
(1.36)
(1.37)
0.356***
0.29***
(4.35)
(4.31)
0.120
0.120
(1.00)
(1.02)
1.048***
0.952***
(8.22)
(8.13)
0.19**
0.188**
(3.06)
(3.09)
-0.064
-0.064
(1.28)
(1.31)
N/A
N/A
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4515
4515
0.37
0.45

Table 6: Dynamic Effects
All columns examine the dynamic effects of changes in creditor rights and in rules governing shareholder
derivative suits. Columns 1-2 report logit results using a deal-level sample with various fixed effects
while Column 3 reports OLS results using an industry-level sample with country, industry and year fixed
effects. We omit the coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables in the interest of brevity. We
compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method
where the clustering is done at the country level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is:
Sample:
Regression model:
Forwarded Creditor Rights Change
Contemporaneous Creditor Rights Change
Lagged Creditor Rights Change
Forwarded Change in Derivative Suit Rules
Contemporaneous Change in Derivative Suit Rules
Lagged Change in Derivative Suit Rules
Control variables
Borrower FE
(Country * Industry) FE
Country and Industry FE
Year FE
Observations
R-squared

(1)
(2)
Prob (PF=1)
Deal
Deal
Logit
Logit
-0.004
-0.013
(0.71)
(1.41)
-0.026*** -0.033**
(3.30)
(2.66)
-0.167*** -0.086***
(3.00)
(3.41)
-0.012
-0.013
(1.17)
(1.40)
-0.014**
-0.042**
(2.65)
(2.29)
-0.147**
-0.071**
(2.25)
(2.43)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
18257
18257
0.65
0.18
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(3)
% PF
Industry, Country, Year
OLS
-0.004
(1.04)
-0.112**
(2.26)
-0.204***
(4.42)
-0.007
(1.47)
-0.072***
(4.18)
-0.135***
(4.61)
Yes
N/A
No
Yes
Yes
4515
0.31

Table 7: Triple-Difference Tests
Columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) report results using Free Cash Flow to Assets (Asset Tangibility) calculated
for U.S. firms. Columns 1 and 2 report logit results using a deal-level sample. Columns 3 and 4 report
OLS results using an industry-level sample. Each specification includes country x year as well as
industry (two-digit SIC) fixed effects. We omit the coefficients and t-statistics for the control variables in
the interest of brevity. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using the cluster-correlated Huber-White
covariance matrix method, clustering at the country level. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is:
Sample
Regression model:
Creditor Rights * Free Cash Flow to
Assets (U.S.)
Change in Derivative Suit Rules * Free
Cash Flow to Assets (U.S.)
Creditor Rights *
Asset Tangibility (U.S.)
Change in Derivative Suit Rules *
Asset Tangibility (U.S.)
Free Cash Flow to Assets (U.S.)

(1)
Prob(PF=1)
Deal
Logit
-0.427**
(2.24)
-0.613**
(2.35)

0.512**
(2.69)
0.736**
(2.82)
0.677*
(2.16)

Asset Tangibility (U.S.)
Control variables
Country x Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
R-squared

(2)
Prob(PF=1)

0.189
(1.18)
Yes
Yes
Yes
13073
0.77

Yes
Yes
Yes
13073
0.73
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(3)
(4)
% PF
% PF
Industry, Country, Year
OLS
-0.793***
(2.85)
-0.762***
(2.96)
0.952***
(3.42)
0.914***
(3.55)
0.757
(1.62)
0.336
(1.68)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
4410
4410
0.43
0.51

Table 8: Additional Robustness Tests
All OLS regressions employ country, year and industry fixed effects. We omit the coefficients and tstatistics for the control variables in the interest of brevity. We compute cluster-robust t-statistics using
the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix method. ***, **, * represent coefficients that are
statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent variable is:
Creditor Rights
Change in Derivative Suit
Rules
Control variables
Borrower FE
Country, industry and year
FE
R-squared

(1)
Maturity of CDF
loans
1.760
(1.54)
1.006
(1.12)
Yes
No
Yes

(2)
Cash Flow from Operations / Capital
Expenditures
0.256
(1.57)
0.304
(1.41)
Yes
No
Yes

(3)
Log (Deal Size in
$m)
1.877
(1.26)
1.160
(1.32)
Yes
No
Yes

0.28

0.37

0.37
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Appendix to Tables: Description of Control Variables and their Sources
Variables
Country Level Data
GDP per capita
Private credit to GDP per capita
Industry-level data
Tobin’s Q

Asset Tangibility
Long Term Debt / Total Assets
Interest Expense/ Net Income
Deal-level data
Deal amount
All-in-spread
Maturity
Secured
Senior

Description

Sources

Real gross domestic product per capita
Ratio of Private credit to gross domestic product per capita

Penn World Tables
Penn World Tables

The median Tobin’s Q for the 4-digit SIC industry. Tobin’s
Q is computed as the ratio of the Market Value of Assets to
their Book Value. The Market Value of Assets is
constructed as the total book value of assets minus the
book value of common equity minus the book value of
deferred taxes plus the market value of equity.
The median net PP&E / total assets for the 4-digit SIC
industry
The median long term debt divided by total assets for the
4-digit SIC industry
The median of interest expense/ net income " for the 4digit SIC industry

Worldscope

The commitment amount at the loan origination, in billions
of dollars
The amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR
for each dollar drawn down
Loan maturity, in years
Equals 1 if the bank loan is secured by collateral, 0
otherwise
Equals 1 if the lenders are senior creditors, 0 otherwise

Dealscan
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Worldscope
Worldscope
Worldscope

Dealscan
Dealscan
Dealscan
Dealscan

